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CLARIFYING WASHINGTON’S APPROACH TO THE
INDEPENDENT DUTY DOCTRINE
Margaret Wykowski*
Abstract: When faced with limited or no recovery under contract law, resourceful lawyers
often turn to tort law. The economic loss rule restricts this practice by barring recovery in tort
for solely economic losses. However, what qualifies as “economic loss” is not always clear. In
2010, the Washington State Supreme Court announced it was clarifying the economic loss rule
by adopting the independent duty doctrine.1 Rather than analyze the type of loss suffered, the
independent duty doctrine determines whether a party owed a tort duty independent of the
relevant contract, closely mirroring a traditional tort inquiry. When establishing the
independent duty doctrine, the court left intact cases decided under the economic loss rule and
the rule’s general role as “the boundary between torts and contract [law].”2
However, the very nature of these two rules conflict. Upholding both rules has led to
bitterly split opinions from the Washington State Supreme Court and confusion among litigants
and other courts. This Comment argues that the court’s construction of the independent duty
doctrine generally, and its decision to maintain the economic loss rule’s theory and
jurisprudence, has resulted in misapplication of the independent duty doctrine by litigants and
within other courts. It proposes that the Washington State Supreme Court clarify the doctrine
by abrogating the state’s economic loss rule jurisprudence and re-framing the independent duty
doctrine analysis around when tort duties can be assumed in a contract.

INTRODUCTION
When faced with limited or no recovery under contract law, resourceful
lawyers frequently turn to tort law. Historically, the Washington State
Supreme Court has applied the economic loss rule to limit this practice.3
The economic loss rule prohibits tort actions for purely economic losses.4
“Economic loss” is a conceptual device used to classify damages, which
are generally defined as losses other than those resulting from personal
injury or property damage.5 However, making these determinations, and
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. Special thanks to
Professor Hugh Spitzer for his guidance, comments, and insightful edits throughout the drafting
process. I would also like to thank the entire Washington Law Review editorial staff for your
invaluable assistance, especially Rachael Clark and Ria Kuruvilla.
1. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 388, 241 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2010).
2. Id. at 416, 241 P.3d at 1275.
3. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965, 969 (2012) (quoting
Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 416, 241 P.3d at 1275 (Chambers, J., concurring)).
4. Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 833, 881 P.2d 986,
996 (1994).
5. See Miller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing how, as Judge
Posner has explained, the term “economic loss” is a misnomer: “It would be better to call it a
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drawing boundaries around what qualifies as an “economic loss” has been
notoriously difficult.6
In 2010, the Washington State Supreme Court announced it was
clarifying the economic loss rule by adopting the independent duty
doctrine.7 Unlike the economic loss rule, which analyzes the type of loss
suffered, the independent duty doctrine determines whether the party
owed a duty independent of the contract.8 Despite this change, the court
left intact the economic loss rule and its caselaw.9
In adopting the independent duty doctrine, the Washington State
Supreme Court attempted to alleviate confusion by abandoning the
economic loss rule’s focus on the type of loss suffered.10 Instead, the
independent duty doctrine asks, “whether the injury is traceable [] to a
breach of a tort law duty of care arising independently of the contract.”11
In practice, the independent duty doctrine inquiry essentially mirrors
Washington State’s traditional tort analysis, which determines whether a
tort duty is owed and when liability attaches regardless of a contract.12
The independent duty doctrine’s traditional tort inquiry naturally
opposes the economic loss rule’s focus on contract remedies—resulting
in confusion.13 For example, the economic loss rule “defaults to contract
remedies where both [tort and contract remedies] are available,”14 while
the independent duty doctrine “defaults to tort remedies” and bars tort
remedies in only a narrow set of circumstances.15 Thus, by leaving intact
the economic loss rule’s jurisprudence, the Washington State Supreme

‘commercial loss,’ . . . because personal injuries and especially property losses are economic losses,
too—they destroy values which can be and are monetized. . . .”); Wash. Water Power Co. v. Graybar
Elec. Co., 112 Wash. 2d 847, 861 n.10, 774 P.2d 1199, 1208 n.10 (1989).
6. R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to
Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1789 (2000).
7. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 398, 241 P.3d at 1266.
8. Id.
9. See Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 442, 450, 243 P.3d
521, 526 n.3 (2010) (“Our decisions in this case and in Eastwood leave intact our prior cases where
we have held a tort remedy is not available in a specific set of circumstances.”). This assertion was
made by a lead opinion that garnered a majority of the votes in result only. Id. However, later
independent duty doctrine cases and opinions accept this assertion as a holding and treat it as part of
the doctrine. See, e.g., Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 104, 312
P.3d 620, 630 (2013) (Madsen, J., dissenting) (finding economic loss rule cases undisturbed under
the new doctrine per the majority’s direction in Affiliated FM).
10. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 387–88, 241 P.3d at 1261.
11. Id. at 394, 241 P.3d at 1264.
12. Id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Madsen, J., concurring).
13. See Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 175, 273 P.3d 965, 974 (2012)
(Madsen, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 172, 273 P.3d at 973.
15. Id.
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Court asked courts to maintain inherently opposite principles in their
application of the new doctrine. Consequently, litigants16 and other
courts17 have struggled to apply and interpret the independent
duty doctrine.
This Comment argues that the maintenance of the economic loss rule,
in the face of the introduction of the independent duty doctrine, fuels
rather than alleviates confusion in Washington State. Part I provides a
descriptive background of the economic loss rule and the development of
the independent duty doctrine in Washington State. Part II introduces key
cases that have applied the independent duty doctrine and uses the tort of
negligent misrepresentation to illustrate how the doctrines handle
situations of overlapping contract and tort law. Part III details the
challenges litigants and courts have faced when applying the independent
duty doctrine. Part IV argues that rather than continuing to balance these
two distinct rules, the Washington State Supreme Court should formally
discontinue the economic loss rule and its jurisprudence and reframe the
independent duty doctrine’s analysis around when a tort duty can be
assumed within a contract.
I.

THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT DEVELOPED
THE INDEPENDENT DUTY DOCTRINE TO CLARIFY THE
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE

A.

The Economic Loss Rule was Intended to Define the Boundary
Between Contract Law and Tort Law

The origins of the economic loss rule date back to the nineteenth
century.18 Historically, when injured plaintiffs have been unable to
recover in contract due to issues such as “lack of privity, [or the]

16. See, e.g., Reading Hosp. v. Anglepoint Grp., Inc., No. C15-0251-JCC, 2015 WL 13145347,
at *3 n.1 (W.D. Wash. May 26, 2015) (finding Microsoft’s counsel’s attempts to apply economic
loss rule reasoning and “misreads” of the Washington State Supreme Court’s independent duty
doctrine as allowing tort remedies in circumstances where it actually limits tort remedies).
17. See Pac. Boring, Inc. v. Staheli Trenchless Consultants, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1167 (W.D.
Wash. 2015), aff’d, 708 F. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2017) (barring a tort claim under the independent duty
doctrine while citing cases and analysis under the economic loss regime).
18. See Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A
Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 897–98 (1989) (providing an in-depth discussion of the history
of the economic loss rule). Some commentators have incorrectly suggested the economic loss rule
emerged during the rise of products liability. See, e.g., Benjamin J. McDonnell, Finding a Contract
in the “Muddle”: Tracing the Source of Design Professionals’ Liability in the Construction Context
Under Washington’s Independent Duty Doctrine, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 627, 632 (2012) (“The
development of the economic loss rule begins with product liability law.”); Barton, supra note 6, at
1794 (“The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine, first articulated by the California
Supreme Court in Seely v. White Motor Co.”).
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unavailability of punitive damages . . . resourceful lawyers have sought to
recover in tort.”19 In an attempt to limit this practice and prevent tort law
from creeping into contract law, judges developed the economic
loss rule.20
Products liability law played a central role in the development of
economic loss rule jurisprudence.21 In Washington State, early products
liability cases established the economic loss rule’s emphasis on the type
of harm suffered.22 This line of cases distinguished “economic loss from
physical harm or property damage.”23 Washington courts subsequently
applied this distinction to other contexts and extended the economic loss
rule beyond products liability, denying tort claims for economic losses in
construction and real property.24 The public policy concept of protecting
the public through tort law versus protecting private parties’ agreements
undergirded these developments.25
Protecting contract law from the encroachment of tort law drove the
development of the economic loss rule.26 The rule restricts parties to
contract remedies in cases where, because of the nature of their damages,
the existing contract provides the “proper” remedy.27 This is because “tort
law is not intended to compensate parties for losses suffered as a result of
a breach of duties assumed only by agreement.”28 Rather, it concerns
“obligations imposed by law, rather than by bargain.”29
Tort law is meant to protect members of society from damaging
behaviors by others and to encourage products that are safe, or at least not
“unreasonably” dangerous to the public.30 As a social policy, tort law
promotes the efficient allocation of resources by creating incentives for
19. Barrett, supra note 18, at 898.
20. See Jeffrey L. Goodman et al., A Guide to Understanding the Economic Loss Doctrine, 67
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (2019) (“It is clear, however, that if this development were allowed to
progress too far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort.” (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Deleval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986))).
21. See Barrett, supra note 18, at 911.
22. See, e.g., Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Grp., Inc., 109 Wash. 2d 406, 420, 745 P.2d
1284, 1291 (1987).
23. Id.
24. See Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 687, 153 P.3d 864, 870 (2007) (detailing the
development of the economic loss rule in Washington State); McDonnell, supra note 18.
25. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 407–08, 241 P.3d 1256, 1271
(2010) (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J., concurring).
26. Jackowski v. Borchelt, 174 Wash. 2d 720, 730, 278 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2012).
27. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 681–82, 153 P.3d at 867–68 (citing Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 822, 881 P.2d 986, 990 (1994)).
28. Id. at 682, 153 P.3d at 868 (quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d
604, 618 (3d Cir. 1995)).
29. Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Grp., Inc., 109 Wash. 2d 406, 420, 745 P.2d 1284, 1291 (1987).
30. Id.
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people and companies to take cost-justified precautions.31 Generally, tort
law’s goal is to restore the plaintiff to the position they were in prior to
the defendant’s harmful conduct.32 “[T]ort duties arise to protect
individuals unable to protect themselves from the unscrupulous actions of
others and irrespective of the existence of a contract.”33
In contrast, contract law protects “society’s interest in [the]
performance of promises.”34 It provides a set of rules to govern bargains
between private individuals. 35 Contract law remedies protect the parties’
expectation interests by returning the injured party to the economic
position they36 would have been in had the other party properly performed
the bargained for promise.37
The economic loss rule was meant to be a bright-line rule to maintain
the separate purposes of tort and contract law.38 Contract law encourages
parties to bargain for their own distribution of risk.39 By limiting the
availability of tort remedies, the economic loss rule is supposed to protect
the integrity of the bargaining process.40 It is also meant to assure
contracted parties greater “certainty” and “predictability” by delineating
the specific risks they assume through agreement.41
The economic loss rule is meant to preserve that certainty.42 Tort
liability is much less predictable than contract liability, and without limits
like the economic loss rule, it can result in open-ended liability.43 It has
long been suggested that the expansion of tort liability—to include
economic damages—would expose parties “to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate

31. Scott Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do? What Can it Do?, 47 VAL. L. REV. 99, 100 (2012).
32. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 682, 153 P.3d at 868.
33. Barton, supra note 6, at 1797.
34. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 682, 153 P.3d at 868.
35. Stuart, 109 Wash. 2d at 420–21, 745 P.2d at 1291–92.
36. Washington Law Review uses “they” and “their” as a single pronoun to avoid gender-specific language.
37. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 682, 153 P.3d at 868 (citing Stuart, 109 Wash. 2d at 420–21, 745
P.2d at 1291–92).
38. Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 826, 881 P.2d 986,
992 (1994).
39. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 682, 153 P.3d at 868; see also Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v.
Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. 1998).
40. Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 826, 881 P.2d at 992.
41. Id.
42. Barton, supra note 6, at 1797; see also Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 826, 881 P.2d at
992 (upholding the economic loss rule “to ensure that the allocation of risk and the determination of
potential future liability is based on what the parties bargained for in the contract”).
43. Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 826, 881 P.2d at 992; see also Harvey S. Perlman,
Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract
Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 71 (1982).
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class.”44 Additionally, the economic loss rule ensures that a party who
fails to adequately cover their risk in the contract cannot “bring a cause of
action in tort to recover benefits they were unable to obtain in contractual
negotiations.”45 Given the specific purpose served by contract law, courts
developed the economic loss rule to preserve contract remedies and
categorically restrict the availability of tort remedies.
Every jurisdiction in the United States applies some form of the
economic loss rule.46 The majority of states follow a strict application of
the economic loss rule, “which prohibits a plaintiff from recovering purely
economic damages in tort without exception.”47 Under this rule, if a
plaintiff suffers only economic damages, they are limited to
contractual remedies.48
A minority of states follow what has been described as “the
intermediate rule.”49 The intermediate rule is substantially similar to the
strict economic loss rule but permits exceptions in a variety of
circumstances.50 The intermediate rule is not uniform; exceptions vary
across jurisdictions.51 There are three main forms of the intermediate rule:
(1) the dangerous defect exception that “allows recovery of economic
damages under tort causes of action when a product defect creates an
unreasonable danger or damages itself in a sudden and unforeseeable
manner”;52 (2) the disappointed expectations test that is similar to the
dangerous defect exception, but only requires that the damage be
unforeseeable;53 and (3) the independent duty doctrine that requires a duty
to exist independent of the contract in order for a plaintiff to bring a
successful tort action.54 These three forms of the intermediate rule, and
the various other less common exceptions, have been criticized for
complicating the economic loss rule.55 Under these exceptions, the
44. Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 826, 881 P.2d at 992 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)).
45. Id. at 827, 881 P.2d at 992–99; see also Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Grp., Inc., 109
Wash. 2d 406, 418, 745 P.2d 1284, 1290 (1987).
46. Goodman et al., supra note 20, at 7.
47. Id. at 16.
48. Id. at 16–17.
49. Id. at 27 (finding seventeen jurisdictions that follow what they describe as the intermediate rule).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 27–28.
53. Id. at 29–30.
54. Id. at 31.
55. Id. at 56 (citing Lesiak v. Cent. Valley AG Coop., Inc., 808 N.W.2d 67, 80 (Neb. 2012)); see
also Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster that Ate Commercial Torts,
69 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (1995) (“[J]udges, lawyers, and commercial clients alike are all desperately
struggling to define the parameters of the economic loss doctrine.”).
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economic loss rule becomes much more nuanced and can no longer be
described as a bright-line rule.
B.

By Adopting the Independent Duty Doctrine, the Washington State
Supreme Court Effectively Overrode the Purpose of the Economic
Loss Rule

In November 2010, the Washington State Supreme Court adopted the
independent duty doctrine.56 The independent duty doctrine abandons the
economic loss rule’s focus on the type of harm suffered and instead asks
“whether the injury is traceable [] to a breach of a tort law duty of care
arising independently of the contract.”57
In its initial announcement, the court did not characterize the
independent duty doctrine as a new rule or even an exception to the
economic loss rule, but rather as a renaming of the economic loss rule.58
The court’s stated purpose was to orient the economic loss rule away from
its focus on the type of harm suffered.59 This section describes the first
cases that announced the independent doctrine and details the theoretical
tensions that immediately surrounded the court’s attempt to apply
both rules.
1.

In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, Inc., the Court
Announced the Independent Duty Doctrine and Shifted the Rule’s
Focus Towards Tort Law

In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, Inc.,60 the Washington State
Supreme Court announced the independent duty doctrine.61 In deciding
the case, the court was unanimous in result only.62 Justice Fairhurst
authored the lead opinion, signed by two justices; Justices Alexander and
Chambers co-authored a concurrence, signed by three justices; and Justice
Madsen authored a concurrence in result only, signed by one justice.63
While distinct, Justice Fairhurst’s lead opinion and Justices Alexander and
Chambers’s concurrence both supported the announcement of the
independent duty doctrine and its application in Eastwood.64 They
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 398, 241 P.3d 1256, 1266 (2010).
Id. at 394, 241 P.3d at 1264.
Id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J., concurring).
Id.
170 Wash. 2d 380, 398, 241 P.3d 1256 (2010).
Id. at 398, 241 P.3d at 1256.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 383, 241 P.3d at 1259; id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J., concurring).
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similarly discussed the doctrine not as a new rule, but as an extension of
the economic loss rule.65
The facts in Eastwood were as follows. Eastwood owned a horse farm
in Poulsbo, Washington and Horse Harbor Foundation was a nonprofit
that cared for “abused and abandoned horses.”66 Horse Harbor Foundation
leased Eastwood’s horse farm property,67 but failed to maintain the
property in a passable condition as required by the parties’ lease
agreement.68 Consequently, Eastwood sued Horse Harbor Foundation for
breach of lease and the tort of waste.69 Horse Harbor Foundation raised
the economic loss rule as a defense, but the Washington State Court of
Appeals “[o]n its own motion and without argument” relied on the
economic loss rule to decide the case.70 The Washington State Supreme
Court thus took the opportunity to review and clarify the economic
loss rule.71
In analyzing whether Eastwood’s recovery was limited by the lease
agreement, the lead opinion first outlined the failings of the economic loss
rule, reasoning that any injury can be monetized and categorized as an
“economic loss.”72 Additionally, the court stated that “[t]he term
‘economic loss rule’ has proved to be a misnomer. It gives the impression
that . . . any time there is an economic loss, there can never be recovery in
tort.”73 Following this critique, the lead opinion declined to apply the
economic loss rule and instead introduced the independent
duty doctrine.74
Announcing the new doctrine, the court held that “[a]n injury is
remediable in tort if it traces back to the breach of a tort duty arising
independently of the terms of the contract.”75 Under the independent duty
doctrine, a plaintiff can recover economic losses in tort, even where there
is a contract, if the injury resulted from the “breaching [of] an independent
and concurrent tort duty.”76 To determine whether an independent duty

65. Id. at 387–88, 241 P.3d at 1261 (majority opinion); id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Alexander, J.
& Chambers, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 383, 241 P.3d at 1259 (majority opinion).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 384–85, 241 P.3d at 1259–60.
71. Id. at 387–88, 241 P.3d at 1261.
72. Id. at 388, 241 P.3d at 1261.
73. Id. at 388–89, 241 P.3d at 1261.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 392, 241 P.3d at 1261–62.
76. Id. at 394, 241 P.3d at 1264.
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existed, the court applied ordinary tort principles.77 Just as in a traditional
tort analysis, once the court finds a duty existed outside the contract, the
plaintiff can recover only if they can establish proximate causation.78
Ultimately, the court held that Eastwood could bring a claim for the tort
of waste, in addition to her contract claims, against Horse Harbor
Foundation.79 “[T]he duty to not cause waste is a tort duty that arises
independently of a lease agreement and an aggrieved lessor may pursue
damages concurrently under theories of tort and breach of lease.”80
Applying the tort theory, the lead opinion concluded there was “ample
evidence” that Horse Harbor Foundation breached its duty to not cause
waste and that its conduct was the proximate cause of the damage to the
property.81 Thus, Eastwood was able to recover in tort law despite the
parties’ lease agreement.82
Justice Madsen’s concurrence agreed in result only. Rather than find
an independent duty, she argued for an exception to the economic loss rule
that would prevent its application to bar statutory causes of action, such
as the tort of waste.83 She characterized the newly announced independent
duty doctrine as “confusing” and asserted that “[t]he lead opinion
incorrectly states a general rule of law that does not accord with our cases
on the economic loss rule.”84 Justice Madsen’s comments were prescient
in identifying the incompatibility of the two approaches, particularly the
challenge of reconciling economic loss rule cases with the independent
duty doctrine approach.85
The introduction of the independent duty doctrine reshaped the
landscape established under the economic loss rule.86 While not formally
abrogating the economic loss rule, Eastwood represents a significant shift
away from the court’s previous deference to contract law.87 The parties in
Eastwood had a lease agreement and the conduct at issue related to Horse
Harbor Foundation’s obligations under the lease.88 However, because the
court found the tort of waste was a duty that existed independent of the
agreement, Eastwood was not limited to contract remedies as they likely
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 392, 241 P.3d at 1263
Id. at 399, 241 P.3d at 1267.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 400, 241 P.3d at 1267.
Id. at 402, 241 P.3d at 1268.
Id. at 406, 404, 241 P.3d at 1269, 1270 (Madsen, J., concurring).
Id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270.
See infra Part II (describing these challenges).
Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 388–89, 241 P.3d at 1261.
Id. at 389, 241 P.3d at 1262.
Id. at 384, 241 P.3d at 1259.

21 Wykowski.docx (Do Not Delete)

1100

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

5/30/20 11:52 PM

[Vol. 95:1091

would have been under the economic loss rule. Justice Fairhurst’s lead
opinion and Justices Alexander and Chambers’s concurrence were clear
that the independent duty doctrine was conceived of as an extension of the
economic loss rule.89 However, their opinions provide no guidance on
how parties and courts should reconcile the differences between the
two rules.
2.

In Affiliated FM Insurance Co. v. LTK Consulting Services, Inc.
the Washington State Supreme Court Applied the Independent Duty
Doctrine and Narrowed the Economic Loss Rule

The same day the court announced the independent duty doctrine in
Eastwood, it applied the doctrine in Affiliated FM Insurance Co. v. LTK
Consulting Services, Inc.90 Unfortunately, the court fractured again,
publishing a 2-4-3 lead opinion, concurrence, and dissent.91 Justice
Fairhurst wrote the lead opinion signed by one other justice.92 Despite not
earning signatures from a majority of the justices, later independent duty
doctrine cases cite the lead opinion for the critical proposition that the
independent duty doctrine does not overrule cases decided under the
economic loss rule.93 Justice Chambers authored a concurrence and
Justice Madsen authored a concurrence and a dissent.94
Affiliated FM was a federal case involving the aftermath of a 2004
Seattle Monorail fire.95 The fire substantially damaged the monorail and
resulted in the evacuation of 150 passengers.96 The City of Seattle had a
concession agreement with Seattle Monorail Services (SMS), a private
company, to maintain and run the monorail and a separate contract with
LTK Consulting Services, Inc. (LTK), another private company, to

89. Id. at 393–94, 241 P.3d at 1264; id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J.,
concurring).
90. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 442, 444, 243 P.3d 521,
523 (2010).
91. Id. at 461, 463, 476, 243 P.3d at 532, 533, 540; see also Rachael Clark, Comment, Piecing
Together Precedent: Fragmented Decisions from the Washington State Supreme Court, 94 WASH. L.
REV. 1989, 2018 (2019) (describing how the Washington State Supreme Court counts votes and
discussing the specific problem of identifying Affiliated FM’s lead opinion).
92. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 443, 243 P.3d at 523.
93. Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 104, 312 P.3d 620, 630
(2013) (Madsen, J., dissenting).
94. Affiliated FM., 170 Wash. 2d at 461, 243 P.3d at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring); id. at 463,
243 P.3d at 533 (Madsen, C.J., concurring & dissenting).
95. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 443, 243 P.3d at 523.
96. Alyssa Burrows, Fire Halts the Seattle Monorail’s “Blue Train” and Passengers are
Evacuated on May 31, 2004, HISTORYLINK (July 10, 2005), http://www.historylink.org/File/7369
[https://perma.cc/37BM-4XRV].
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recommend repairs.97 Adding yet another layer, SMS had purchased fire
insurance through Affiliated FM Insurance Company (AFM Insurance).98
Ultimately, AFM Insurance sued LTK for negligence in its repair work,
even though SMS and LTK were not in privity of contract because LTK
was a contractor of the monorail operator, SMS.99 The litigation
concerned which company should be liable for the damage to the
monorail system.100
A federal district court applied the economic loss rule finding that
because SMS’s losses were “purely economic,” LTK was not liable in tort
to SMS; therefore, the district court granted LTK summary judgment.101
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the
Washington State Supreme Court: “May party A . . . who has a
contractual right to operate commercially and extensively on property
owned by non-party B . . . sue party C . . . in tort for damage to that
property, when A . . . and C . . . are not in privity of contract[?]”102
Writing the lead opinion, Justice Fairhurst used this opportunity to apply
the independent duty doctrine announced in Eastwood.103
To apply the independent duty doctrine, the court first had to determine
if a duty was owed.104 Oddly, in this case, the question was not whether a
duty was owed independent of the contract, because the parties did not
have a contract.105 The lead opinion separated the tort “duty question” into
three inquires: “Does an obligation exist? What is the measure of care
required? To whom and with respect to what risks is the
obligation owed?”106
In considering whether a duty was owed, the opinion also considered
the interests at hand in each remedy.107 A contract remedy, or lack thereof
in this case, would maintain the parties’ expectation interests; and a tort
remedy would serve the policy interest of safety of persons and property
from physical injury.108 The lead opinion recognized that each remedy
drives different incentives, noting that “[t]ort liability would force
negligent engineers to internalize the costs of their unreasonable conduct,
97. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 445, 243 P.3d at 523–24.
98. Id. at 445, 243 P.3d at 524.
99. Id. at 445, 243 P.3d at 523–24.
100. Id. at 446, 243 P.3d at 524.
101. Id. at 446–47, 243 P.3d at 524.
102. See McDonnell, supra note 18, at 650 (citing Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 447, 243 P.3d at 525).
103. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 442, 243 P.3d at 523.
104. Id. at 449, 243 P.3d at 526.
105. Id. at 444–46, 243 P.3d at 523–24 (describing the facts).
106. Id. at 449, 243 P.3d at 526.
107. Id. at 452, 243 P.3d at 527–28.
108. Id.
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making them more likely to take due care.”109 Justice Fairhurst also
acknowledged that the recognition of a duty in the case of economic harm
increases liability and costs overall, but concluded that considerations of
public safety outweighed those risks.110 Ultimately, the lead opinion found
that LTK owed a duty of care independent of its contract with the City of
Seattle and permitted AFM Insurance to sue for negligence.111
Justice Fairhurst also clarified that the newly restyled independent duty
doctrine did not overrule cases determined under the economic loss
rule.112 Despite earning the majority in result only, future independent
duty doctrine cases cite to this proposition in the lead opinion as
decided.113 Thus, the lead opinion’s preservation of economic loss rule
cases has been incorporated into the doctrine and has contributed to the
on-going struggle over how to define it.
The concurrence, authored by Justice Chambers and earning three
additional votes, agreed in result only.114 He argued that the case should
be treated “like an ordinary tort case” that did not implicate the
independent duty doctrine and found it well-established in existing tort
law that professionals owe a duty to exercise the degree of care established
as reasonable in their professional community.115
The dissent, authored by Justice Madsen, essentially agreed with the
concurrence that the case should have been resolved in tort alone, and
found that, because there was no contract between the parties, the
economic loss rule did not apply.116 Still, the dissent took the opportunity
to strongly reject the independent duty doctrine analysis and relied on
economic loss rule principles in its reasoning, ignoring the court’s
decision in Eastwood.117
The court’s split decision illustrates the tension that immediately
surrounded the independent duty doctrine in Washington State. Rather
than provide a clear example, Affiliated FM exposed divisions within the
court over issues such as when the doctrine applies and how to define its
relationship to tort law. The lead opinion’s finding that the economic loss
rule cases are still good law under the independent duty doctrine
exacerbated these tensions.

109. Id. at 453, 243 P.3d at 528.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 460–61, 243 P.3d at 532.
112. Id. at 450, 243 P.3d at 526 n.3.
113. Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 104, 312 P.3d 620, 630
(2013) (Madsen, J., dissenting).
114. Affiliated FM., 170 Wash. 2d at 461–62, 243 P.3d at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 476, 243 P.3d at 539 (Madsen, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Id. at 464–69, 243 P.3d at 533–35 (Madsen, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT’S
RECOGNITION OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT DUTY
DOCTRINE DEMONSTRATES ITS INCOMPATIBILITY WITH
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE

Despite the Washington State Supreme Court’s direction that the
independent duty doctrine is simply an extension of the economic loss
rule, in practice, the rules demonstrate marked differences. This is
especially true when the court has grappled with whether to recognize tort
claims that were barred under the economic loss rule.
The independent duty doctrine changed the court’s framework for
recognizing new tort claims.118 The economic loss rule recognized tort
claims in only a limited set of circumstances.119 Conversely, the
independent duty doctrine starts with the assumption that tort claims are
valid and only limits them in a narrow set of circumstances.120 In Elcon
Construction, Inc. v. Eastern Washington University,121 the court held that
the independent duty doctrine would apply to prevent tort claims in only
a “narrow” class of cases––specifically, claims arising out of construction
and real estate.122 The court based its limitation on Eastwood’s direction
“not to apply the doctrine to tort remedies ‘unless and until this court has,
based upon considerations of common sense, justice, policy and
precedent, decided otherwise.’”123
The court’s treatment of the tort of negligent misrepresentation under
the independent duty doctrine is one example of how the doctrine differs
from the economic loss rule. Historically, many states have struggled with
how the economic loss rule applies to claims of fraud such as negligent
misrepresentation.124 This section illustrates these differences and
struggles in Washington State by describing how the court treated the tort
of negligent misrepresentation under the economic loss rule and its current
treatment under the independent duty doctrine.

118. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 105, 312 P.3d at 632 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
119. Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 683–84, 153 P.3d 864, 868 (2007).
120. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 387, 241 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2010);
Terence Scanlan, A View Five Years from Eastwood and Affiliated FM: Washington’s Transition
from Economic Loss Doctrine to Independent Duty Doctrine, SKELLENGER BENDER, P.S. (Nov. 10,
2015), http://www.skellengerbender.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2015-11-10-WA_sTransition-from-ELD-to-Independent-Duty-Doctrine.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXM5-YGPQ].
121. 174 Wash. 2d 157, 273 P.3d 965 (2012).
122. Id. at 165, 273 P.3d at 969.
123. Id. at 165, 273 P.3d at 970 (quoting Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 417, 241 P.3d at 1256).
124. See Barton, supra note 6, at 1790 (discussing the history of various states’ treatment of claims
arising out of a defendant’s fraudulent conduct under the economic loss rule).
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Washington recognizes the tort of negligent misrepresentation and
largely follows the elements identified in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 552(1) approach.125 Under this rule, liability for negligent
misrepresentation extends only to defendants who are “manifestly aware”
of how the information they supplied will be used.126 Whether the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to not misrepresent information is
a question of law.127
Prior to the introduction of the independent duty doctrine, the economic
loss rule typically prevented negligent misrepresentation claims where the
parties had a contract.128 For example, in Berschauer/Phillips
Construction Co. v. Seattle School District No. 1,129 the Washington State
Supreme Court applied the economic loss rule and barred a general
contractor from asserting a negligent misrepresentation claim against
design professionals.130 The court’s reasoning focused on the “beneficial
effect to society when contractual agreements are enforced and
expectancy interests are not frustrated.”131 Similarly, in Alejandre v.
Bull,132 the buyer and seller had a contract limiting liability and
disclaiming risk.133 Under the agreement, new home buyers were barred
from asserting a negligent misrepresentation claim against the seller.134 In
this case, the court expressed both a willingness to apply the economic
loss rule to bar negligent misrepresentation claims against sophisticated
and unsophisticated parties where a contract existed, while
acknowledging that circumstances of unconscionability could still control
the result.135
After the independent duty doctrine replaced the economic loss rule,
the Washington State Supreme Court shifted its treatment of negligent

125. Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 95, 312 P.3d 620, 625
(2013); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
126. 16A DAVID K. WOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: TORT LAW &
PRACTICE § 19:12 (4th ed. 2019) (Negligent Misrepresentation).
127. Id.
128. Id.; see also Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 153 P.3d 864 (2007) (holding the economic
loss rule barred plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim); Griffith v. Centex Real Estate Corp.,
93 Wash. App. 202, 969 P.2d 486 (1998), as amended on denial of recons. (Dec. 14, 1998) (holding
the economic loss rule barred plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim).
129. 124 Wash. 2d 816, 881 P.2d 986 (1994).
130. Id. at 833, 881 P.2d at 996.
131. Id. at 828, 881 P.2d at 993.
132. 159 Wash. 2d 674, 153 P.3d 864 (2007).
133. Id. at 678, 153 P.3d at 866.
134. Id. at 682, 153 P.3d at 865.
135. See id. at 689, 153 P.3d at 871 (“If there is significant disparity in bargaining power, likely
accompanied by some other contractual infirmity, then there may be an issue as to enforceability of
the contract—a different question from whether tort remedies should be available.”).

21 Wykowski.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/30/20 11:52 PM

WASHINGTON’S INDEPENDENT DUTY DOCTRINE

1105

misrepresentation tort claims.136 In Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting
Engineers, Inc.,137 a narrow majority of the court led by Justice Fairhurst
found that “a negligent misrepresentation claim might exist ‘to the extent
the duty to not commit negligent misrepresentation is independent of the
contract.’”138 This case was decided in 2013, three years after the court
adopted the independent duty doctrine and declared that economic loss
rule cases still applied.139 Donatelli, described below, represents a major
departure from economic loss rule cases, which had barred negligent
misrepresentation claims in similar contexts.140
A.

The Donatelli Majority: The Evolving Independent Duty Doctrine
and Its Relationship to the Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation

In Donatelli, the Washington State Supreme Court directly addressed
a negligent misrepresentation claim under the independent duty
doctrine.141 The Donatellis owned property in King County and hired D.R.
Strong as their engineer to develop the property.142 The parties signed a
written contract that outlined D.R. Strong’s primary duties and limited
D.R. Strong’s professional liability to $2,500 or the amount of
professional fees charged to the Donatellis.143
D.R. Strong procured preliminary approval for the project with King
County but failed to obtain final approval.144 Thus, the sixty-day
preliminary approval expired before the project was complete.145 The
Donatellis lost the property in foreclosure before D.R. Strong could obtain
new approvals from the county.146
The Donatellis sued D.R. Strong for breach of contract, professional
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of Washington’s
Consumer Protection Act.147 They claimed damages in excess of $1.5
million.148 D.R. Strong moved for partial summary judgment arguing that
Washington’s economic loss rule barred the Donatellis’ negligence and
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 95, 312 P.3d 620, 625 (2013).
179 Wash. 2d 84, 312 P.3d 620 (2013).
Id. at 96, 312 P.3d at 626.
Id.
See id. at 88, 312 P.3d at 622 (discussing the parties’ written contract).
Id. at 90, 312 P.3d at 623.
Id. at 87, 312 P.3d at 621.
Id. at 88, 312 P.3d at 622; id. at 108, 312 P.3d at 631 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 88, 312 P.3d at 622 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 89, 312 P.3d at 622.
Id.
Id.
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negligent misrepresentation claims because the claims arose out of the
contract and could be classified as economic losses.149 The trial court and
court of appeals denied the motion, holding that “the independent duty
doctrine did not bar the Donatellis from bringing negligence claims
against D.R. Strong because professional engineers owe duties to their
client independent of any contractual relationship.”150 A narrow majority
of the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed.151 Justice Fairhurst
authored the majority opinion joined by four other justices.152
In discussing the negligence claim, Justice Fairhurst laid out a critical
requirement of the independent duty doctrine analysis asserting that “[t]he
analytical framework provided by the independent duty doctrine is only
applicable when the terms of the contract are established by the record.”153
The majority considered the record “unclear,” despite a written and signed
contract between the parties, because the Donatellis alleged D.R. Strong’s
oral representations and affirmative conduct expanded the scope of
the contract.154
The majority opinion refused to dismiss the Donatellis’ negligent
misrepresentation action because she found the Donatellis were
fraudulently induced to enter into the contract by D.R. Strong’s promises
of a limited project scope, timeline, and fees.155 The court held that “the
duty to avoid misrepresentations that induce a party to enter into a contract
arise independently of the contract.”156 Because D.R. Strong’s duty to
avoid negligent misrepresentation arose independent of the contract, the
court permitted the Donatellis’ negligent misrepresentation claim
to stand.157
This holding rejected the economic loss rule approach, which likely
would have precluded these tort actions because the causes of action arose
out of the contract and the Donatellis suffered only economic losses. This
difference is notable because the previous independent duty doctrine
opinions were clear that the independent duty doctrine was not a rejection,
but a renaming, of the economic loss rule and its cases.158

149. Id.
150. Id. at 90, 312 P.3d at 622.
151. Id. at 98, 312 P.3d at 627.
152. Id.; id. at 119, 312 P.3d at 637 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 92, 312 P.3d at 624 (majority opinion).
154. Id. at 91, 312 P.3d at 623.
155. Id. at 94, 312 P.3d at 625.
156. Id. at 91, 312 P.3d at 623.
157. Id.
158. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965, 969 (2012);
Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 393–94, 241 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2010).
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The Donatelli Dissent Highlights the Discord Between the
Independent Duty Doctrine and the Economic Loss Rule,
Especially the Court’s Recognition of the Tort of Negligent
Misrepresentation

Donatelli v. D.R. Strong was a five-four decision.159 The dissenting
opinion, written by Justice Madsen, echoed previous dissents and
concurrences she had written since Eastwood v. Horse Harbor
Foundation.160 The dissent unearthed the substantive and practical
distinctions between the economic loss rule and the independent duty
doctrine and argued for a return to the pure economic loss rule.161
First, the dissent asserted that the majority failed to adhere to its prior
independent duty doctrine decisions, which had committed to applying
existing economic loss rule jurisprudence.162 The dissent argued the facts
in Donatelli were indistinguishable from a previous case decided under
the economic loss rule, Berschauer/Phillips, and thus Berschauer/Phillips
should have controlled the outcome of Donatelli.163 In
Berschauer/Phillips, the court held that “the economic loss rule does not
allow a general contractor to recover purely economic damages from a
design professional in tort.”164 Since Donatelli similarly concerned the
obligations of a design professional to a land owner, and the remedies
available where a contract exists, the dissent argued the
Berschauer/Phillips’s holding should apply.165
Next, Justice Madsen lodged a broader critique of the independent duty
doctrine and argued for a return to the economic loss rule.166 Her
reasoning echoed the strong contract law-oriented principles that led to
the economic loss rule’s original development.167 She urged that the
independent duty doctrine improperly preferences tort remedies by

159. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 98, 312 P.3d at 627 (Justices Owens, González, Stephens, and
Chambers concurring in the majority opinion authored by Justice Fairhurst; Justice Madsen
dissenting, joined by Justices Wiggins, Johnson, and Johnson).
160. See id. at 99, 312 P.3d at 627 (Madsen, J., dissenting); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK
Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 442, 463, 243 P.3d 521, 533 (2010) (Madsen, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 402, 241 P.3d
1256, 1268 (2010) (Madsen, J., concurring).
161. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 99–100, 312 P.3d at 627–28.
162. Id. at 104, 312 P.3d at 630 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 102, 312 P.3d at 628–29.
164. Id.; Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 833, 881 P.2d
986, 996 (1994).
165. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 102, 312 P.3d at 628–29 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 105, 312 P.3d at 630.
167. See supra Part I.
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starting with the premise, “why not allow tort remedies?”168 Instead,
Justice Madsen argued that, when a contract governs the relationship, the
more appropriate question should be: “[w]hether the dispute or claim is
within the scope of the contract and if so why allow any remedies outside
the contract?”169 This inquiry necessarily leads back to the original
economic loss rule’s analysis and its focus on contract law
and remedies.170
The dissent then analyzed the claims at issue, focusing on the type of
loss suffered, as one would under the economic loss rule.171 She found
that, even in the complaint, the parties alleged the same facts in their
breach of contract claim as in their negligence and negligent
misrepresentation claims.172 This drove Justice Madsen to conclude that
“these causes of action all arise out of the contract and the alleged failure
to meet contractual obligations. They involve no personal injuries or
damage to property.”173 Consequently, the dissent argued, the remedies
should be contractual only.174
Finally, the dissent reasoned that the case could have been resolved
under traditional contract law principles by giving effect to the
professional limitation of liability in the contract.175 She argued that
regardless of the liability at issue, contract or tort, the damages should be
covered by the provision.176
Justice Madsen’s dissent illustrates the different conclusions one
reaches when applying the independent duty doctrine versus the economic
loss rule and its cases. While the independent duty doctrine permits
independent and concurrent duties in both contract and tort, thereby
recognizing the tort of negligent misrepresentation, the economic loss rule
would have limited the contracting parties to contractual remedies only.

168. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 105, 312 P.3d at 630 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 105–06, 312 P.3d at 630 (“[T]he economic loss rule, unlike the ‘independent duty
doctrine’ as explained by the majority, more appropriately focuses on the parties’ contractual
relationship and asks what is covered by the contract, and treats personal injury and physical harm as
appropriately remedied in tort.”).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 106, 312 P.3d at 631.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 107, 312 P.3d at 631.
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Attorneys Representing Large Commercial Parties Share Justice
Madsen’s Concerns that the Independent Duty Doctrine is a
Departure from, Not an Extension of, the Economic Loss Rule

Justice Madsen is not alone in her critique of the independent duty
doctrine and advocacy for the former economic loss rule.177 Proponents of
the economic loss rule insist the rule is essential to preserving the role of
contract in society because it provides a bright line rule that permits
recovery in tort only when the losses are non-economic.178 They argue the
independent duty doctrine has exposed their commercial clients to
unpredictable liabilities.179 These same critics argue strong contract
doctrines drive economic growth by guaranteeing commercial parties’
greater certainty because contracts allow parties to manage their own
risk.180 This approach is most efficacious in the commercial arena where
sophisticated parties can fairly negotiate agreements and expect to be held
to those agreements regardless of the outcome.181
The Donatelli majority and dissenting opinions, and commentators’
critiques of the doctrine, illustrate the ongoing tension between the two
rules. The opposite driving principles and deference to contract law versus
tort law result in different treatment of torts such as negligent
misrepresentation. This issue is exacerbated by the court’s decision to
establish a new doctrine without officially abrogating the previous rule.
Recognizing the tort of negligent misrepresentation in Donatelli not only
frustrates contract purists like Justice Madsen, but also fuels confusion as
lower courts and federal district courts struggle to define the outer limits
of the new doctrine and its relationship to the economic loss rule.182

177. See Paul R. Cressman, Jr., More Confusion Over Independent Duty Doctrine – Washington
Supreme Court Deeply Divided, AHLERS CRESSMAN & SLEIGHT PLLC (Dec. 12, 2013),
https://www.acslawyers.com/more-confusion-over-independent-duty-doctrine-washington-supremecourt-deeply-divided/ [https://perma.cc/U97Z-5XM3]; Brian Esler, Washington Supreme Court
Announces the Death of Contracts: Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., MILLER NASH
GRAHAM & DUNN LLP (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.millernash.com/washington-supreme-courtannounces-the-death-of-contracts-donatelli-v-dr-strong-consulting-engineers-inc-11-18-20131/
[https://perma.cc/V3FX-XC5R]; Scanlan, supra note 120.
178. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 175, 273 P.3d 965, 974 (2012)
(Madsen, J., concurring).
179. See Esler, supra note 177.
180. See Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 104, 312 P.3d at 630 (Madsen, J., dissenting); see also id.;
Cressman, supra note 177; Scanlan, supra note 120.
181. Barton, supra note 6, at 1789.
182. See infra Part III.
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III. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT’S
MAINTENANCE OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE HAS
CONFUSED LITIGANTS AND OTHER COURTS APPLYING
THE INDEPENDENT DUTY DOCTRINE
The Washington State Supreme Court’s series of fractured opinions
since the introduction of the independent duty doctrine and its inconsistent
treatment of economic loss rule jurisprudence has resulted in the
misapplication of the doctrine by litigants and other courts.183
The first major point of confusion surrounds when the independent
duty doctrine bars tort remedies. In Elcon Construction, Inc. v. Eastern
Washington University, the Washington State Supreme Court determined
that the doctrine applied only “to a narrow class of cases, primarily
limiting its application to claims arising out of construction on real
property and real property sales.”184 The court was attempting to clarify
that the independent duty doctrine only bars tort remedies in limited
areas—construction on real property and real property sales—but
otherwise allows tort remedies in all other contexts.185 Despite this decree,
litigants have misconstrued the Washington State Supreme Court’s
directions to stand for the opposite principle.
Litigants and other courts have incorrectly held or argued that the
independent duty doctrine bars tort remedies in all contexts except
construction on real property and real property sales. For example, in
Reading Hospital v. Anglepoint Group, Inc.,186 a federal district court
chided Microsoft’s counsel for misreading the doctrine.187 “Microsoft
misreads . . . the independent duty doctrine [as] allow[ing] tort remedies
stemming from contract disputes only in cases involving construction on
real property and real property sales.”188 It is illuminating that even
presumably sophisticated counsel was unable to understand and apply the
basics of Washington’s independent duty doctrine. Unfortunately, courts
have fallen prey to the same misreading.
Litigants have also confused the mechanics of the independent duty
doctrine. Seattle-Tacoma International Taxi Association v. Kochar189
involved a dispute between an airport taxi association and taxi drivers.190

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965, 969 (2012).
Id.
No. C15-0251-JCC, 2015 WL 13145347 (W.D. Wash. May 26, 2015).
See id. at *3 n.1.
Id.
No. 70843-1-I, 2014 WL 7340248 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at *1.
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The association induced the taxi drivers to join its organization and pay
up to $20,000 in initiation fees by affirmatively representing that the
association would retain its contract with the airport, which it later lost.191
After the taxi drivers refused to pay the remaining balance of the fees due,
the association sued the drivers for breach of contract.192 The drivers
counterclaimed for negligent misrepresentation among other causes of
action.193 After losing at the trial court, on appeal counsel for the taxi
association argued that the independent duty doctrine barred the taxi
drivers’ negligent misrepresentation claim.194 The court ultimately
dismissed the claim because it did not arise out of “construction on real
property and real property sales.”195 However, the fact that the association
relied on the independent duty doctrine in the first place, demonstrates the
perplexing relationship between the independent duty doctrine and the
economic loss rule. Under the economic loss rule this may have been a
successful defense for the association. The taxi drivers suffered purely
economic losses and historically the court applied the economic loss rule
to bar negligent representation claims.196 But what the association missed,
is that the independent duty doctrine triggers a totally different analysis
than the economic loss rule. The independent duty doctrine would not
have barred the taxi drivers claim per se. Rather, it would have triggered
a separate inquiry and asked whether the taxi association “[had] an
independent duty to avoid negligent misrepresentation.”197 As Donatelli
demonstrated, this inquiry could have easily led to liability for the
association based on the negligent misrepresentation claims.
These missteps likely derive from the different nature of the two rules.
Generally, when the economic loss rule applies, it bars tort claims; but
when the independent duty doctrine applies, it permits tort claims by
finding an independent duty.198 Despite these differences, because the
court conceived the independent duty doctrine as an extension of the
economic loss rule, it still “bars” claims in the same contexts as the
economic loss rule. Some litigants and courts have missed this nuance.
This is likely because the court did not officially reject the economic loss
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at *6 (quoting Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965,
969 (2012)).
196. See Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 689, 153 P.3d 864, 871 (2007) (finding the economic
loss rule precluded a negligent misrepresentation claim).
197. Seattle-Tacoma Int’l Taxi Ass’n, 2014 WL 7340248, at *6.
198. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 416–17, 241 P.3d 1256, 1276
(2010) (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J., concurring).
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rule when it adopted the independent duty doctrine. Instead, they merely
inserted the new term despite the rules’ differences.199
Another area of confusion has been the extent to which cases decided
under the economic loss rule still apply under the independent duty
doctrine. In Affiliated FM, the lead opinion stated, “[o]ur decisions in this
case and in Eastwood leave intact our prior cases where we have held a
tort remedy is not available in a specific set of circumstances.”200 Despite
this pronouncement, courts diverged in their willingness to follow
economic loss rule jurisprudence. Courts’ varied treatment of the duties
owed by design and engineering professionals highlights this challenge.
For example, in Pacific Boring, Inc. v. Staheli Trenchless Consultants,
Inc.,201 a federal district court held that a general contractor did not owe a
professional duty of care to its subcontractor in an engineering context.202
The case concerned unexpected soil conditions at a sewer line project.203
In analyzing the duties owed, the court declined to follow the more recent
independent duty doctrine case, Affiliated FM, which had carved out a
source of liability for engineers.204 Instead, the court found the facts more
akin to Berschauer/Phillips, an older economic loss rule case that found
design professionals did not owe a duty independent of the parties’
contract.205
This is compared to Donatelli v. D.R. Strong and Pointe at Westport
Harbor Homeowners’ Association v. Engineers Northwest, Inc.,206 both
of which concerned professional duties owed by engineers.207 In these
cases, the Washington State Supreme Court and the court of appeals of
Washington, Division Two, explicitly followed Affiliated FM and
declined to follow Berschauer/Phillips.208 Of course, these cases had
some factual differences from Pacific Boring, Inc.; but ultimately, they all
concerned professional duties owed by engineers in the construction
industry and applied the relevant caselaw differently.
These examples highlight the unpredictability of the independent duty
doctrine when considered alongside economic loss rule cases. Each of
199. Id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270.
200. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 442, 450 n.3, 243 P.3d
521, 526 (2010).
201. 138 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2015), aff’d, 708 F. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2017).
202. Id. at 1167.
203. Id. at 1159.
204. Id. at 1167.
205. Id.
206. 193 Wash. App. 695, 376 P.3d 1158 (2016).
207. Id.
208. Pointe at Westport Harbor Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Eng’rs Nw., Inc., 193 Wash. App. 695, 376
P.3d 1158 (2016); Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 95, 312 P.3d
620, 625 (2013).
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these cases concerned the duties design professionals owed in commercial
contexts, but had different outcomes based on how the court treated and
distinguished past cases decided under the economic loss rule versus the
independent duty doctrine. The result is a hyper-fact-specific inquiry as to
when design professionals owe duties. This uncertainty prevents the
development of a cohesive and predictable body of law under the
new doctrine.
The continued application of both the economic loss rule and
independent duty doctrine affects litigants and other courts. Litigants have
confused and incorrectly relied on the doctrine. In addition, independent
duty doctrine cases have diverged in their treatment of economic loss rule
cases. This pattern risks unfair outcomes for plaintiffs in Washington
State and adds to an increasingly confusing body of caselaw for other
courts and litigants to apply.
IV. WASHINGTON SHOULD CLARIFY THE INDEPENDENT
DUTY DOCTRINE BY ABROGATING ITS ECONOMIC LOSS
RULE JURISPRUDENCE
A contradictory situation has resulted from the Washington State
Supreme Court’s adoption of the independent duty doctrine and the series
of divided opinions that have followed. While the court intended to clarify
the economic loss rule, the effect has been greater confusion. In order for
the independent duty doctrine to succeed, the court should divorce the
independent duty doctrine from the economic loss rule and its caselaw. It
should then revise the independent duty doctrine analysis by clarifying
under what circumstances a duty can be assumed within a contract.
First, the Washington State Supreme Court should deliberately depart
from the economic loss rule.209 The economic loss rule is distinct from the
independent duty doctrine. Its allegiance to contract law drives different
outcomes than the independent duty doctrine.210 It also partially rests on
classifications of damages, economic versus noneconomic, that the
independent duty doctrine rejects.211 These differences make economic
loss rule jurisprudence antagonistic to the independent duty doctrine.
Additionally, the maintenance of the economic loss rule and the
independent duty doctrine have befuddled other courts and litigants
applying the doctrine. This is exacerbated by cases like Donatelli, where
209. This shift is especially important given the Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Services,
Inc.’s lead opinion’s lack of precedential effect discussed in Part II of this Comment.
210. See supra Part II (discussing Donatelli and the tort of negligent misrepresentation).
211. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 388, 241 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2010)
(discussing the economic loss rule); see also Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs, Inc.,
170 Wash. 2d 442, 449, 243 P.3d 521, 536 (2010).
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the court changed its position on the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
The result is an even more tortured fact-specific doctrine than the previous
economic loss rule. The court should clarify the independent duty doctrine
by officially rejecting the economic loss rule.
Second, the court should clarify the independent duty doctrine analysis.
This proposal does not depart from the independent duty doctrine
described in Eastwood and its progeny.212 Rather, it makes explicit the
steps already described within those opinions and offers another way to
frame the independent duty doctrine analysis.
As it stands, the role of the parties’ existing contract in analyzing what
remedy applies is unclear under the independent duty doctrine.213 If the
duty exists as a matter of law and the duty is subsumed within the contract,
then what remedy applies? Will the independent duty doctrine prevent the
party from accessing tort remedies? The current independent duty
doctrine answers this question by asking, “whether the injury is
traceable . . . to a breach of a tort law duty of care arising independently
of the contract.”214 But this framing begs another question, when is a duty
“independent” of the contract?
The court’s current independent duty doctrine analysis does not
establish a clear framework to answer this second question. The
Washington State Supreme Court should reframe the analysis by leaving
its substance intact, but also by providing a path to more clearly address
under what circumstance the court is likely to find an “independent duty”
and allow tort remedies even if the parties have a contract.
The independent duty doctrine’s core question and analysis should be
reframed to ask: under what circumstances can tort duties be assumed in
a contract? This is a helpful reframing because, where tort duties can
lawfully be assumed within a contract, only contractual remedies should
apply.215 Using this question, the court’s independent duty doctrine
analysis can be broken down as follows: (1) Was a duty owed, and was
the duty breached?; (2) Did the parties have a contract and can the duty
be assumed within a contract? If a tort duty was owed and breached as a
matter of law, the injury should be remedied in tort, unless the parties had
a contract and the duty can be assumed in contract.
212. Jackowski v. Borchelt, 174 Wash. 2d 720, 730–32, 278 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2012); Affiliated
FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 449, 243 P.3d at 526; Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 393–94, 241 P.3d at 1264.
213. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 464 n.9, 243 P.3d at 533 (Madsen, C. J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (suggesting that under the lead opinion’s description of the independent duty
doctrine “finding a tort duty is equivalent to finding an ‘independent duty’” which then precludes a
contractual remedy).
214. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 394, 241 P.3d at 1264.
215. See Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 116, 312 P.3d 620,
631 (2013) (Madsen, J., dissenting) (discussing contract law principles).
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According to the court’s current independent duty doctrine
jurisprudence, whether a duty can be assumed within a contract, depends
on the following factors:216 (1) does the contract specify the obligations of
the party, including the specific duty at issue; (2) what is the nature of the
contract—for example, the court has said more duties may be assumed by
contract in construction, real property, and real property sales than in other
contexts;217 and finally, (3) do public policy considerations militate in
favor of allowing parties to contract for a private remedy or is the public
better served by allowing tort remedies to be available regardless of the
parties contract?218 Answering these questions should determine when the
court will allow a duty to be assumed by contract even if it also exists as
a matter of law.
The court’s fractured opinions, and its volleying between old economic
loss rule principles and the new concept, have resulted in a messy doctrine
that is difficult for litigants and lower courts to apply. The Washington
State Supreme Court should abrogate the economic loss rule and clarify
the independent duty doctrine by making its analysis, especially with
respect to the role of the existing contracts, more explicit. This proposed
reframing of the analysis does not substantively alter the independent duty
doctrine. Rather, it is one example of how the court could improve the
doctrine by defining what the independent duty doctrine really means for
contracting parties and elevating under what circumstances a duty may be
assumed in a contract or is “independent” of the contract.
CONCLUSION
The essential aims and theoretical underpinnings of the independent
duty doctrine and the economic loss rule conflict. The economic loss rule
“defaults to contract remedies where both are available,” while the
independent duty doctrine defaults to tort remedies.219 It is misleading to
litigants and lower courts to leave both rules intact and suggest they are
not in fundamental tension. The Washington State Supreme Court can
remedy this tension by, first, officially rejecting the economic loss rule
and its cases. Additionally, the court can improve the independent duty
doctrine by making its analysis more explicit. The doctrine was born
amidst a divided court. This has resulted in a series of fractured opinions
216. Notably, these are the same factors to answer whether a duty is “independent,” this Comment
has just reframed the analysis. See Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 92, 312 P.3d at 624; Eastwood, 170
Wash. 2d at 393–94, 241 P.3d at 1264.
217. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 92, 312 P.3d at 623–24.
218. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965, 969 (2012)
(citing Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 416, 241 P.3d at 1256 (Chambers, J., concurring)).
219. Id. at 172, 273 P.3d at 973 (Madsen, J., concurring).
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that confusingly meander between tort and contract law without
forwarding a clear analysis to be applied by litigants and other courts. The
court can preserve the independent duty doctrine and improve its
usefulness by moving away from the emphasis on “independent duties”
and reframing the analysis around when a tort duty can be assumed
by contract.

